Economic Development of Singapore (1960s – 1970s) Period of labour intensive industrialisation & industrial development
1. Challenges of the 1960s (after Separation) 2. The Need for Planning 3. Industrialization : Labour-Intensive Industries (1960s to late 1970s) – UN Mission Survey – Role of Dr Goh Keng Swee – Pragmatic Industrial Policies – Role of Government Agencies (EDB, JTC, HDB, NTUC) 4. Results of Industrial Development – Benefits – Problems of Pollution 5. Industrial Restructuring – Reasons for I.R. – What is I.R.? – Strategies of I.R.
What economic challenges did Singapore face in the 1960s?
Source A: Comment by Mr Lee Kuan Yew on Separation “We faced tremendous odds with an improbable chance of survival. Singapore was not a natural country but man-made...We inherited the island without its hinterland, a heart without a body.” What did separation mean for Singapore? Why do you think Lee Kuan Yew called it his “moment of anguish?”
Source B: Statistics of Singapore’s population in 1960s
Source C: A historian’s account of British actions in the 1960s. The tumultuous decade of the 1960s ended with more crises. One involved the loss of some 15 per cent of official reserves kept in sterling when the British pound was devalued in 1967. Related to the devaluation in reflecting the poor shape of the British economy, the British military withdrawal of the East of Suez announced in 1968 roused two concerns. One was the economic vacuum left by the British bases which contributed one-fifth both to GDP and employment in the 1960s. The other was the necessity for Singapore to build up its own defence forces from scratch, a taxing undertaking both in terms of funds and expertise. Low, Linda. The Political Economy of a City-State: Government-made Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1998.
SUMMARY: Singapore’s economic challenges in the 1960s: – Lack of natural resources & common market – Rising population, > unemployment – Withdrawal of British troops
What were the reasons for Singapore’s economic growth and success from 1965 to 1979? • The role of the government (overarching link): The government had the foresight and adaptability to turn the economic challenges into prosperity. • The role of the UN survey mission. • The role of Goh Keng Swee, “economic architect”. • Pragmatic industrial strategy. • The establishment of government agencies
UN Survey Mission provided the strategy for industrialization • Invited by Dr Goh Keng Swee in 1960 • Led by Dr Albert Winsemius – Businessman in the Dutch shipping industry and a former director-general for industrialization in the Netherlands) – Chief Economic Advisor from 1961 to 1984 – Visited Singapore two or three times a year without fail to review economic performance indicators and to discuss macro-economic strategy with government planners.
“It was Singapore's good fortune that he took a deep and personal interest in Singapore's development. Singapore and I personally are indebted to him for the time, energy and development he gave to Singapore. I am proud to have known him and to have been his friend.” (Lee Kuan Yew on Albert Winsemius)
In pairs or group of 3:
Research on Dr Goh Keng Swee and his role in Singapore’s economic growth from 1965-1979
Read the handout and summarise the essential economic development of each decade (1960s to 2000s) in any format you deem suitable.
• Submit presentation via e-mail or thumbdrive to ongby@hc.edu.sg before Mar. 8 (Tuesday), 8pm
Pragmatic Industrial Strategy Source A: Import-Substituting Industrialisation Import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) was the preferred route to economic development. It was assumed that there existed potential industries which, if protected in their initial “infant” phase, would mature and compete in the world market. ISI would replace previously imported goods with domestic production and simultaneously fulfill aspirations of industrialisation. It appealed to newly independent countries as a manifestation of economic nationalism: protected enterprises, often state-owned, were seen as a means to developing indigenous enterprise.
What is ISI? Who did ISI appeal to? Why?
Source B: The failures of Import-Substituting Industrialisation The difficulties associated with import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) became increasingly obvious. Protected infant industries failed to mature…ISI policies often led to the entrenchment of business and labour groups, which committed resources to retaining domestic monopoly privileges rather than to raising productivity and competing for world markets. For Singapore, the loss of a common market after separation effectively ruled out ISI as a feasible development path as there no longer existed a large domestic market to consume the goods produced by ISI.
What were the failures of Import-substituting industrialisation? Why was ISI not an option for Singapore?
Source C: Export-oriented industrialisation program and MNCs From 1967 onwards, the government adopted an export-oriented industrialisation program. It meant that instead of rejecting foreign influence, Singapore now opened its market to multinational companies (MNCs) and focused on exporting goods to the Western and industrialized countries. The government’s hospitable policy towards foreign investment has been accompanied by the recognition that, given the absence of domestic industrialists, only large multinational firms possessed the requisite technology and marketing capabilities to successfully penetrate competitive world markets. Singapore benefited from the MNCs through the inward transfer of management skills and technology. What was the export-oriented industrialisation program about? How was the export-oriented industrialisation beneficial for Singapore?
Source D: Industrial Relations A new umbrella organization for labour unions, known as the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) was organised. This organization formed a partnership between organized labour and government. No strikes were to be called except with the approval of the NTUC and by extension, the government. In the early 1960s, it had a competitor in the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU), which was led by much more radical forces. Over time, a combination of job expansion and the arrests of many of the leaders of the SATU and its member unions gave the NTUC dominance over the labour union movement. The subsequent decline in strikes and confrontations added greatly to Singapore’s draw among foreign businessmen. How did the government deal with the strikes of the 1960s? How were the government’s measures beneficial for economic growth?
SUMMARY: The philosophy of pragmatic industrial strategy: - Import-substitution less viable – no large domestic market - No aversion to foreign investment – the usual anti-colonial aversion to western enterprises – Singapore large commercial, little domestic manufactures – - MNCs bring own markets, management, technology & jobs - Idea that providing econ growth & jobs best answer to communism – pol & econ discontent fertile ground for socialism
The timing of the pragmatic industrial strategy was another important factor which contributed to Singapore’s economic growth. - According to Goh Keng Swee, Singapore had four lucky breaks: Indonesia invited world oil companies to explore for oil in the seas around the archipelago; the campaign of the Red Guards in China made both Hong Kong and South Korea less attractive to foreign investors, and there were unexpected booms in tourism and in building which gave a great stimulus to the economy.
- In addition, Singapore was focusing on the manufacturing of electronics and in the 1960s, the electronic industry was looking to move their manufacturing offshore. The range of products included transistor radios, tape-recorders, television, stereo sound systems, electronic computers, and satellite communications equipment.
RESULTS The period 1968 to 1973 saw very fast economic growth, between 11.5% and 13.7% annual increase in GDP.
In 1965, the per capita income was US$460. By 1975, the 10th year of independence, it had risen to US$2500.
References: Doshi, Tilak & Coclanis, Peter. “The economic architect: Goh Keng Swee”. In Lee’s Lieutenants: Singapore’s Old Guard, pp. 24-55. Edited by Lam Peng Er and Kevin Y.L. Tan. St Leonards, N.S.W. : Allen & Unwin, 1999.
Lee, Edwin. Singapore: The Unexpected Nation. Singapore: Institution of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Role of Government Agencies in Singapore’s Economic Growth from 1965 – 1979 Form a group with 3 - 4 members. Each group will be tasked to find out more about a government agency and design a one-page handout for your classmates.
Your one-page handout has to answer the questions. The last question in bold requires serious thinking, research and analysis on your part. You may choose to present your handout in the classic notes style, or choose more creative presentation modes like concept mapping tools (http://cmap.ihmc.us/).
You will make your presentation during next Tuesday’s class. Each presentation should take no longer than 5 minutes.
In the 1960s, Singapore was a third world country with a GNP per capita of less than US$320. Infrastructure was poor, there was little capital; the handful of industries produced only for domestic consumption. Low-end commerce was the mainstay of the economy, and there was little or no direct foreign investment.
There was massive unemployment and labour unrest following the withdrawal of the British troops.
Creating jobs was the priority, and this meant attracting labour-intensive industries. But first, there had to be an environment conducive to industrial development.
Thus, Jurong Industrial Estate was born. A swampy area along the west coast of the island, Jurong was transformed into Singapore's first industrial estate. The Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB), formed in 1961 with a budget of $100 million, set about the challenge of convincing foreign investors that Singapore was a good place for business.
Singapore's industrialisation programme began with factories producing garments, textiles, toys, wood products and hair wigs. Along with these labour-intensive industries were capital and technology-intensive projects from companies such as Shell Eastern Petroleum and the National Iron and Steel Mills.
The expulsion of Singapore from Malaya in 1965 meant the loss of a vast hinterland from which to draw raw materials, as well as a large domestic market to absorb finished goods. The new challenge for Singapore was to develop export-oriented industries. EDB opened its first overseas centres in Hong Kong and New York to be better placed to woo foreign investors.
Guiding Questions 1. Why was EDB set up? 2. What were its responsibilities? 3. What is EDB’s role in Singapore’s economic development today? What are its present aims? Are there any similarities or differences which you can identify?
Although the EDB built smaller estates as well (four on sites of 7 to 42 acres by 1963), the major project of the EDB has been the development of the Jurong Industrial Estate. Discussed as far back as 1952, the idea was carefully researched by GOH and his ministry throughout 1960. Jurong is an area west of the City of Singapore, which in 1960 consisted of mangrove swamp and low forested hills. A major advantage was that it faced deep water. As planned by the EDB the Jurong Estate would be the first multimillion dollar industrial complex for Singapore—indeed for Southeast Asia—and its development would mark a major change for Singapore from trade to industry.
Eighty-six hundred acres would be drained, leveled and developed over a 10-year period, and its housing area would accommodate anticipated workers and their families. The Housing Development Board would build low cost flats, shops, schools and commercial centers in two large areas adjoining the industrial sites, and these would be enhanced by parks and open spaces. Two new access roads would be developed, reducing travel from Jurong to Singapore City from 17 to 12 miles. One of the link roads would require a causeway which would in turn convert the Jurong River into a large fresh water lake. The lake would provide storage for 300 million gallons of industrial water, make 200 acres of new land available for agriculture and eliminate the danger of flooding.
The government announced that it intended to spend S$122 million on infrastructure such as earthworks, roads, bridges, sewerage, railways, sea walls, land acquisition and resettlement projects. The planned approach road from the city would give easy access to wharves and the area set aside for heavy industry. Noxious industries, heavy industry, and shipbuilding and breaking yards would be located by the sea; light industry would be placed adjacent to these areas. Great difficulties and serious doubts notwithstanding, this grandiose scheme has been, for the most part, carried out as planned—and later expanded—and the economic results have been dramatic.
In September 1962 GOH laid the foundation stone of the National Iron and Steel Mills, the first heavy industry to be built in Jurong. The government was a major partner in this S$50 million investment. At the same time it was announced that a S$23 million shipyard would soon be started with 50 percent Japanese and 50 percent Singaporean capital. The government was also going ahead with construction of prefabricated factories for light industries to be completed by the end of the year. GOH’s idea was that factories should be built so that interested industries could move in and begin production almost immediately, eliminating costly lead-in time for land purchase and construction. Land, however, was to be kept available for heavy industry and industries with special needs.
By September 1963 the government had invested S$73 million in Jurong, including S$14 million for a wharf project which, when complete, would offer 9,000 feet of deep water wharf space and 3,000 feet of shallower draftage. Private firms had invested another S$160 million. In only three years, private investment was double government infrastructure investment….
…By November 1967 there were 101 factories operating in Jurong; 26 had opened during the year and 60 more were in the development stage. The new wharf was in operation and a U.N. Technical Assistance Board expert had spent three months at Jurong preparing a final master plan for the area. Commenting on this the following year, Foreign Minister Rajaratnam noted that many had questioned the wisdom of the Jurong project (calling it "GOH’s folly"), but that "if there were no Jurong today we might have instead mass unemployment, starvation and riots."
The Jurong Town Corporation Bill was passed by parliament in May 1968, with the Corporation assuming responsibility from the EDB for the management of Jurong and six other industrial estates. Together these included 293 factories; 21,000 workers; a S$588 million capital investment; 9 blocks of flatted factories (factories located on one or more floors of a larger building) under construction; and 4,500 flats and 150 chophouses in Jurong. The latter continued to be a problem because the housing estates still had no social or recreational facilities and youth attracted to jobs at Jurong were mostly single and preferred to live in the city with their families. Flatted factories, proved unexpectedly popular, with long waiting lists for occupancy.
…In his Budget Speech to Parliament in December 1968 GOH announced that the government had made a three percent profit on its capital investment in the Jurong industrial infrastructure, higher than was originally anticipated. This revenue was expected to rise to seven to eight percent in the future, and factories which had rented more space than they actually needed in the first years of industrial development were being asked to release space.
Guiding Questions 1. What did the Jurong Industrial Estate provide? What conditions made it an ideal location? Who did it cater to? 2. What were the achievements of the Jurong Industrial Estate? 3. What is the name of the government agency set up to oversee the Jurong Industrial Estate? What is its role in Singapore’s economic development today?
HDB was set up in 1960, at a time when a large number of people were still living in unhygienic, potentially hazardous slums and crowded squatter settlements packed in the city centres.
Taking over from its predecessor, the Singapore Improvement Trust, HDB was tasked with solving the nation's housing crisis. It built 21,000 flats in less than three years. By 1965 it had built 54,000 flats, exceeding the 50,000 target of its First Five-Year Building Programme. Today, about 84 percent of Singaporeans live in HDB flats compared with only nine percent in 1960 when HDB was first established.
That such difficult goals were met reflected the soundness of the strategy adopted in the approach to public housing, which proved effective in handling the housing crisis of the 1960s. The strategy comprised three important fundamentals.
Firstly, the concept of a sole agency in charge of public housing enabled more effective resource planning and allocation. This made it possible for HDB to secure land, raw materials and manpower for large-scale construction to optimize results and achieve economies of scale.
Secondly, a total approach to housing was adopted. From planning and design to land assembly and construction, and through allocation, management and maintenance, the housing task was viewed as a seamless whole.
Lastly, strong government support in the form of political and financial commitment, as well as legislation helped put the early public housing programme on the right track to housing the nation.
Guiding Questions
How did the establishment of the HDB contribute to Singapore’s economic growth from 1965 – 1979?
Chua Beng Huat talks about the “symbols of success”. What success is he referring to? Why might this perspective be neglected in the given write-up taken from the Housing Development Website?
Period of labour intensive industrialisation & industrial development
1. Challenges of the 1960s (after Separation)
2. The Need for Planning
3. Industrialization : Labour-Intensive Industries (1960s to late 1970s)
– UN Mission Survey
– Role of Dr Goh Keng Swee
– Pragmatic Industrial Policies
– Role of Government Agencies (EDB, JTC, HDB, NTUC)
4. Results of Industrial Development
– Benefits
– Problems of Pollution
5. Industrial Restructuring
– Reasons for I.R.
– What is I.R.?
– Strategies of I.R.
What economic challenges did Singapore face in the 1960s?
Source A: Comment by Mr Lee Kuan Yew on Separation
“We faced tremendous odds with an improbable chance of survival. Singapore was not a natural country but man-made...We inherited the island without its hinterland, a heart without a body.”
What did separation mean for Singapore?
Why do you think Lee Kuan Yew called it his “moment of anguish?”
Source B: Statistics of Singapore’s population in 1960s
Source C: A historian’s account of British actions in the 1960s.
The tumultuous decade of the 1960s ended with more crises. One involved the loss of some 15 per cent of official reserves kept in sterling when the British pound was devalued in 1967. Related to the devaluation in reflecting the poor shape of the British economy, the British military withdrawal of the East of Suez announced in 1968 roused two concerns. One was the economic vacuum left by the British bases which contributed one-fifth both to GDP and employment in the 1960s. The other was the necessity for Singapore to build up its own defence forces from scratch, a taxing undertaking both in terms of funds and expertise.
Low, Linda. The Political Economy of a City-State: Government-made Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1998.
SUMMARY:
Singapore’s economic challenges in the 1960s:
– Lack of natural resources & common market
– Rising population, > unemployment
– Withdrawal of British troops
What were the reasons for Singapore’s economic growth and success from 1965 to 1979?
• The role of the government (overarching link): The government had the foresight and adaptability to turn the economic challenges into prosperity.
• The role of the UN survey mission.
• The role of Goh Keng Swee, “economic architect”.
• Pragmatic industrial strategy.
• The establishment of government agencies
UN Survey Mission provided the strategy for industrialization
• Invited by Dr Goh Keng Swee in 1960
• Led by Dr Albert Winsemius
– Businessman in the Dutch shipping industry and a former director-general for industrialization in the Netherlands)
– Chief Economic Advisor from 1961 to 1984
– Visited Singapore two or three times a year without fail to review economic performance indicators and to discuss macro-economic strategy with government planners.
“It was Singapore's good fortune that he took a deep and personal interest in Singapore's development. Singapore and I personally are indebted to him for the time, energy and development he gave to Singapore. I am proud to have known him and to have been his friend.” (Lee Kuan Yew on Albert Winsemius)
In pairs or group of 3:
- Research on Dr Goh Keng Swee and his role in Singapore’s economic growth from 1965-1979
- Read the handout and summarise the essential economic development of each decade (1960s to 2000s) in any format you deem suitable.
• Submit presentation via e-mail or thumbdrive to ongby@hc.edu.sg before Mar. 8 (Tuesday), 8pmPragmatic Industrial Strategy
Source A: Import-Substituting Industrialisation
Import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) was the preferred route to economic development. It was assumed that there existed potential industries which, if protected in their initial “infant” phase, would mature and compete in the world market. ISI would replace previously imported goods with domestic production and simultaneously fulfill aspirations of industrialisation. It appealed to newly independent countries as a manifestation of economic nationalism: protected enterprises, often state-owned, were seen as a means to developing indigenous enterprise.
What is ISI?
Who did ISI appeal to? Why?
Source B: The failures of Import-Substituting Industrialisation
The difficulties associated with import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) became increasingly obvious. Protected infant industries failed to mature…ISI policies often led to the entrenchment of business and labour groups, which committed resources to retaining domestic monopoly privileges rather than to raising productivity and competing for world markets. For Singapore, the loss of a common market after separation effectively ruled out ISI as a feasible development path as there no longer existed a large domestic market to consume the goods produced by ISI.
What were the failures of Import-substituting industrialisation?
Why was ISI not an option for Singapore?
Source C: Export-oriented industrialisation program and MNCs
From 1967 onwards, the government adopted an export-oriented industrialisation program. It meant that instead of rejecting foreign influence, Singapore now opened its market to multinational companies (MNCs) and focused on exporting goods to the Western and industrialized countries. The government’s hospitable policy towards foreign investment has been accompanied by the recognition that, given the absence of domestic industrialists, only large multinational firms possessed the requisite technology and marketing capabilities to successfully penetrate competitive world markets. Singapore benefited from the MNCs through the inward transfer of management skills and technology.
What was the export-oriented industrialisation program about?
How was the export-oriented industrialisation beneficial for Singapore?
Source D: Industrial Relations
A new umbrella organization for labour unions, known as the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) was organised. This organization formed a partnership between organized labour and government. No strikes were to be called except with the approval of the NTUC and by extension, the government. In the early 1960s, it had a competitor in the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU), which was led by much more radical forces. Over time, a combination of job expansion and the arrests of many of the leaders of the SATU and its member unions gave the NTUC dominance over the labour union movement. The subsequent decline in strikes and confrontations added greatly to Singapore’s draw among foreign businessmen.
How did the government deal with the strikes of the 1960s?
How were the government’s measures beneficial for economic growth?
SUMMARY:
The philosophy of pragmatic industrial strategy:
- Import-substitution less viable – no large domestic market
- No aversion to foreign investment – the usual anti-colonial aversion to western enterprises – Singapore large commercial, little domestic manufactures –
- MNCs bring own markets, management, technology & jobs
- Idea that providing econ growth & jobs best answer to communism – pol & econ discontent fertile ground for socialism
The timing of the pragmatic industrial strategy was another important factor which contributed to Singapore’s economic growth.
- According to Goh Keng Swee, Singapore had four lucky breaks: Indonesia invited world oil companies to explore for oil in the seas around the archipelago; the campaign of the Red Guards in China made both Hong Kong and South Korea less attractive to foreign investors, and there were unexpected booms in tourism and in building which gave a great stimulus to the economy.
- In addition, Singapore was focusing on the manufacturing of electronics and in the 1960s, the electronic industry was looking to move their manufacturing offshore. The range of products included transistor radios, tape-recorders, television, stereo sound systems, electronic computers, and satellite communications equipment.
RESULTS
The period 1968 to 1973 saw very fast economic growth, between 11.5% and 13.7% annual increase in GDP.
In 1965, the per capita income was US$460. By 1975, the 10th year of independence, it had risen to US$2500.
References:
Doshi, Tilak & Coclanis, Peter. “The economic architect: Goh Keng Swee”. In Lee’s Lieutenants: Singapore’s Old Guard, pp. 24-55. Edited by Lam Peng Er and Kevin Y.L. Tan. St Leonards, N.S.W. : Allen & Unwin, 1999.
Lee, Edwin. Singapore: The Unexpected Nation. Singapore: Institution of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Role of Government Agencies in Singapore’s Economic Growth from 1965 – 1979
Form a group with 3 - 4 members. Each group will be tasked to find out more about a government agency and design a one-page handout for your classmates.
Your one-page handout has to answer the questions. The last question in bold requires serious thinking, research and analysis on your part. You may choose to present your handout in the classic notes style, or choose more creative presentation modes like concept mapping tools (http://cmap.ihmc.us/).
You will make your presentation during next Tuesday’s class. Each presentation should take no longer than 5 minutes.
Group A: Economic Development Board
The 1960s: A time of turbulence and economic uncertainty
(http://www.edb.gov.sg/edb/sg/en_uk/index/about_edb/our_history/the_1960s.html)
In the 1960s, Singapore was a third world country with a GNP per capita of less than US$320. Infrastructure was poor, there was little capital; the handful of industries produced only for domestic consumption. Low-end commerce was the mainstay of the economy, and there was little or no direct foreign investment.
There was massive unemployment and labour unrest following the withdrawal of the British troops.
Creating jobs was the priority, and this meant attracting labour-intensive industries. But first, there had to be an environment conducive to industrial development.
Thus, Jurong Industrial Estate was born. A swampy area along the west coast of the island, Jurong was transformed into Singapore's first industrial estate. The Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB), formed in 1961 with a budget of $100 million, set about the challenge of convincing foreign investors that Singapore was a good place for business.
Singapore's industrialisation programme began with factories producing garments, textiles, toys, wood products and hair wigs. Along with these labour-intensive industries were capital and technology-intensive projects from companies such as Shell Eastern Petroleum and the National Iron and Steel Mills.
The expulsion of Singapore from Malaya in 1965 meant the loss of a vast hinterland from which to draw raw materials, as well as a large domestic market to absorb finished goods. The new challenge for Singapore was to develop export-oriented industries. EDB opened its first overseas centres in Hong Kong and New York to be better placed to woo foreign investors.
1. Why was EDB set up?
2. What were its responsibilities?
3. What is EDB’s role in Singapore’s economic development today? What are its present aims? Are there any similarities or differences which you can identify?
Group B: Jurong Industrial Estate
The 1972 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Government Service
BIOGRAPHY of Goh Keng Swee
(http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Biography/BiographyGohKengSwe.htm)
Although the EDB built smaller estates as well (four on sites of 7 to 42 acres by 1963), the major project of the EDB has been the development of the Jurong Industrial Estate. Discussed as far back as 1952, the idea was carefully researched by GOH and his ministry throughout 1960. Jurong is an area west of the City of Singapore, which in 1960 consisted of mangrove swamp and low forested hills. A major advantage was that it faced deep water. As planned by the EDB the Jurong Estate would be the first multimillion dollar industrial complex for Singapore—indeed for Southeast Asia—and its development would mark a major change for Singapore from trade to industry.
Eighty-six hundred acres would be drained, leveled and developed over a 10-year period, and its housing area would accommodate anticipated workers and their families. The Housing Development Board would build low cost flats, shops, schools and commercial centers in two large areas adjoining the industrial sites, and these would be enhanced by parks and open spaces. Two new access roads would be developed, reducing travel from Jurong to Singapore City from 17 to 12 miles. One of the link roads would require a causeway which would in turn convert the Jurong River into a large fresh water lake. The lake would provide storage for 300 million gallons of industrial water, make 200 acres of new land available for agriculture and eliminate the danger of flooding.
The government announced that it intended to spend S$122 million on infrastructure such as earthworks, roads, bridges, sewerage, railways, sea walls, land acquisition and resettlement projects. The planned approach road from the city would give easy access to wharves and the area set aside for heavy industry. Noxious industries, heavy industry, and shipbuilding and breaking yards would be located by the sea; light industry would be placed adjacent to these areas. Great difficulties and serious doubts notwithstanding, this grandiose scheme has been, for the most part, carried out as planned—and later expanded—and the economic results have been dramatic.
In September 1962 GOH laid the foundation stone of the National Iron and Steel Mills, the first heavy industry to be built in Jurong. The government was a major partner in this S$50 million investment. At the same time it was announced that a S$23 million shipyard would soon be started with 50 percent Japanese and 50 percent Singaporean capital. The government was also going ahead with construction of prefabricated factories for light industries to be completed by the end of the year. GOH’s idea was that factories should be built so that interested industries could move in and begin production almost immediately, eliminating costly lead-in time for land purchase and construction. Land, however, was to be kept available for heavy industry and industries with special needs.
By September 1963 the government had invested S$73 million in Jurong, including S$14 million for a wharf project which, when complete, would offer 9,000 feet of deep water wharf space and 3,000 feet of shallower draftage. Private firms had invested another S$160 million. In only three years, private investment was double government infrastructure investment….
…By November 1967 there were 101 factories operating in Jurong; 26 had opened during the year and 60 more were in the development stage. The new wharf was in operation and a U.N. Technical Assistance Board expert had spent three months at Jurong preparing a final master plan for the area. Commenting on this the following year, Foreign Minister Rajaratnam noted that many had questioned the wisdom of the Jurong project (calling it "GOH’s folly"), but that "if there were no Jurong today we might have instead mass unemployment, starvation and riots."
The Jurong Town Corporation Bill was passed by parliament in May 1968, with the Corporation assuming responsibility from the EDB for the management of Jurong and six other industrial estates. Together these included 293 factories; 21,000 workers; a S$588 million capital investment; 9 blocks of flatted factories (factories located on one or more floors of a larger building) under construction; and 4,500 flats and 150 chophouses in Jurong. The latter continued to be a problem because the housing estates still had no social or recreational facilities and youth attracted to jobs at Jurong were mostly single and preferred to live in the city with their families. Flatted factories, proved unexpectedly popular, with long waiting lists for occupancy.
…In his Budget Speech to Parliament in December 1968 GOH announced that the government had made a three percent profit on its capital investment in the Jurong industrial infrastructure, higher than was originally anticipated. This revenue was expected to rise to seven to eight percent in the future, and factories which had rented more space than they actually needed in the first years of industrial development were being asked to release space.
1. What did the Jurong Industrial Estate provide? What conditions made it an ideal location? Who did it cater to?
2. What were the achievements of the Jurong Industrial Estate?
3. What is the name of the government agency set up to oversee the Jurong Industrial Estate? What is its role in Singapore’s economic development today?
Group C: Housing Development Board
(http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10296p.nsf/WPDis/About%20UsA%20Brief%20Background%20-%20HDB%27s%20Beginnings?OpenDocument&SubMenu=A_Brief_Background)
HDB was set up in 1960, at a time when a large number of people were still living in unhygienic, potentially hazardous slums and crowded squatter settlements packed in the city centres.
Taking over from its predecessor, the Singapore Improvement Trust, HDB was tasked with solving the nation's housing crisis. It built 21,000 flats in less than three years. By 1965 it had built 54,000 flats, exceeding the 50,000 target of its First Five-Year Building Programme. Today, about 84 percent of Singaporeans live in HDB flats compared with only nine percent in 1960 when HDB was first established.
That such difficult goals were met reflected the soundness of the strategy adopted in the approach to public housing, which proved effective in handling the housing crisis of the 1960s. The strategy comprised three important fundamentals.
Firstly, the concept of a sole agency in charge of public housing enabled more effective resource planning and allocation. This made it possible for HDB to secure land, raw materials and manpower for large-scale construction to optimize results and achieve economies of scale.
Secondly, a total approach to housing was adopted. From planning and design to land assembly and construction, and through allocation, management and maintenance, the housing task was viewed as a seamless whole.
Lastly, strong government support in the form of political and financial commitment, as well as legislation helped put the early public housing programme on the right track to housing the nation.